CE 480

Essays in Engineering Ethics

 

 

[taken from Texas A&M University, Center for Ethics]

 

 

Basic Concepts And Methods In Ethics

 

(ESSAY #2)

 

Introduction

 

As with any other higher-order intellectual activity, resolving moral problems requires that we be both analytical and imaginative. In the analytical mode, we sort out the component parts of ethical problems. This activity helps us in knowing what kinds of solutions are appropriate. However, resolving ethical problems often requires something more. In the imaginative mode, we can think as creatively as we can about ways of resolving moral problems. This creative activity takes many forms,

including imagining creative new ways of reconciling conflicting moral claims.

 

Factual, Conceptual, and Moral Issues

 

Let us begin by considering some of the analytical devices that are useful in resolving moral issues. We can begin with a case. Suppose James is a chemical engineer who

changed employment from Company A to Company B. Before leaving Company A, his manager asked him to sign a document in which he agreed to keep confidential any

proprietary information which he acquired at Company A. Soon after he arrives at Company B, James is assigned to solve a problem involving a new emission,

Compound X, which is not regulated by the EPA. James' new manager does not know whether to be concerned about Compound X or not. However James realizes that

some of the proprietary information he acquired at Company A might enable him to modify the manufacturing process at Company B so that the suspicious new product

would not be produced in the first place. This information would be used in an entirely different way than it was used by Company A and would not harm the competitive

position of Company A with respect to Company B, but James still wonders whether he should approach his new manager with a proposal that requires the use of this

information.

 

There are three different types of issues in this case. It is important to distinguish them, for they can be found in most moral problems.1

 

The first kind of issue is a factual issue, i.e. an issue having to do with the truth or falsehood of factual claims. The primary example of a factual issue in this case is the

question whether Compound X really is a health hazard. If James could come up with information that Compound X really is not any type of hazard and that the EPA

would not be concerned with it at all, he would not have any problem. He could simply forget the whole thing. If James cannot determine whether or not Compound X is

hazardous, or if he finds out that indeed it is a serious health hazard, then he has a difficult problem. So this factual issue has a crucial bearing on the issue James faces.

 

A second kind of issue is a conceptual issue, i.e. an issue having to do with the meaning or scope of a term or concept. The primary example of a conceptual issue in

this case is the question whether the use of the information gained at Company A for the new problem at Company B would constitute a use of proprietary information.

What, precisely, is the scope of the term "proprietary information"? Company A might have defined this term so precisely in the agreement which James signed that there is

no room for doubt in this case. However, the document may be too generally worded to provide an easy answer to this question. Yet the problem that James faces is vitally

affected by the question whether the information that James would pass on to Company B would be "proprietary information."

 

There are many cases in ethics and in the law where conceptual issues are crucially important. One of the crucial questions in the abortion debate is whether the fetus is a

"human person." A normal adult human being is unquestionably a person, but what about a fetus? If we say a fetus is a "potential person," do we want to say that

"potential persons" have the rights of actual persons? George Bush was a "potential president" from the time he was born, but he did not have the rights of a president until

much later.

 

Judges often face conceptual problems. Suppose a city ordinance excludes "four-wheeled vehicles" from the park. Does this include wagons? What about skate boards?

 

A third kind of issue that arises in a moral debate is a genuine moral issue, i.e. a question having to do with the relevance or application of one or more moral principles.

Notice that there is a broad and a narrow sense of the term "moral issue." In the broad sense, the entire set of factual, conceptual, and moral issues raised by James'

situation could be called a moral issue. In the narrower sense, only the issue involving determining the relevance or application of a moral principle (or principles) to the

situation is a moral issue.

 

Sometimes the application of moral principles to particular situations is relatively uncontroversial. For example, if Compound X is a virulent carcinogen and is emitted in

large quantities by Company B, then most people would probably agree that its emission should be stopped. The general prohibition against knowingly harming other

people would necessitate this conclusion. But suppose Compound X produces only mild respiratory problems in a small percentage of the population and that removing the

compound is so expensive that it would force the plant to discontinue a product line and lay off part of the plant's work force. Suppose, further, that there is already a

serious unemployment problem in the town and many employees might have to leave town to find work. Then there might be serious disagreement over what should be

done.

 

It is important to distinguish these three kinds of issues, because they are resolved in different ways. A factual issue is resolved by investigation or empirical research. A

conceptual issue is resolved by coming to agreement over the proper definition or scope of a term. A moral issue is resolved by agreement over the proper application of

one or more moral principles.

 

It is also important to keep in mind that the resolution of factual and conceptual issues may be just as controversial and just as difficult as the resolution of moral

issues--sometimes even more so. In many situations it is difficult or impossible to determine the relevant facts, especially when the factual issues have to do with the

prediction of the likely consequences of events in the future. Scientists may simply disagree over the likelihood of a meltdown in an atomic power plant or the probable

effects of storing toxic wastes in a particular location. Similarly, arguments over the definitions of "bribe" or "proprietary" may be very difficult to resolve. Nevertheless,

people can disagree over moral issues, so let us examine these disagreements in more detail.

 

Relevance and Conflict Problems

 

A moral issue involves a dispute about the proper application of one or more moral principles. There are two common problems that we face in applying moral principles:

relevance problems and conflict problems.2 In a relevance problem, we are not sure whether a principle applies in a particular situation. Whether James' applying the

process he developed at Company A to the new situation in Company B is a use of proprietary information is a relevance problem. Its resolution depends on the prior

resolution of the conceptual issue as to how we define "proprietary." In a conflict problem, we are faced with two or more principles which seem to apply to a particular

situation, and yet the two principles require different and incompatible actions. For example, suppose an engineer feels that she has an obligation both to stay with an

employer who has been supportive of her over a number of years and an obligation to move to another company where she could participate in the development of a new

line of environmentally safe products. Here she faces a conflict problem, because apparently her obligation to her old employer and her obligation to contribute her special

expertise to the development of environmentally safe products cannot both be honored.

 

Often, the answer to a conceptual issue provides the answer to a relevance problem as well. For example, the question whether the information James used to help

Company B was "proprietary" is a relevance problem, but it depends on the definition of the term "proprietary." Once we know the definition of "proprietary" we will

probably know whether James' action was a form of theft.

 

A Method for Resolving Relevance Problems

 

Since relevance problems are created because we have encountered a situation in which the application of a concept is unclear, it makes sense to go back to a situation in

which the application of the concept is clear. Then, by comparing the similarities and differences between the cases in which the application of a concept is clear and the

cases in which the application is unclear, we can come to some conclusion about the propriety of applying the concept in the questionable case. This method involves three

steps.3

 

First, set up a series of cases, ranging from a case where the concept clearly applies, through a series of ambiguous cases, to a case in which the concept clearly does not

apply. Consider James' problem again. Since the question whether using the information gained at Company A to help Company B with a new process is "theft" (and

therefore wrong) amounts to the question whether the information passed on is really "proprietary," James should imagine a case where there is a clear transfer of

proprietary information. We can call this the positive paradigm case, because it is a case in which the use of the term "proprietary" to describe the information that is

transferred is clearly appropriate. Then he should imagine a case in which the term "proprietary" clearly is not appropriate as a description of the information that is

transferred. We can call this the negative paradigm case, because it is a clear case in which the term in question does not apply. Then we can imagine a series of

intermediary cases between the two extremes, starting with cases only slightly different from the positive paradigm case and ending with cases only slightly different from

the negative paradigm case. One of these intermediary cases should be the case in question, which we can call the test case. The situation would look like this:

 

Positive Negative

 

Paradigm Paradigm

 

Case Intermediate Cases Case

 

C-P+ C-1 C-2 C-3 C-4 C-5 C-P-

 

Let us assume that C-3 is the test case. The number of intermediary cases can vary, of course. In some instances, it may be not be necessary to have any intermediary cases

except the test case. In other instances, the complexity of the issues may require a number of intermediary cases.

 

Second, the morally relevant similarities and differences among the various cases must be enumerated. There is no magic formula for determining what is and is not

morally relevant. Rather, you must rely on your own sense of what is morally relevant. In James' case, for example, one of the characteristics of the positive paradigm case

would probably be that it would give Company B a competitive edge over Company A. This is morally relevant because it relates directly to the fundamental reason that a

company would want to keep certain information secret. Another characteristic of the positive paradigm case would be that exactly the same process is being transferred

from Company A to Company B. By contrast, a negative paradigm case might be one in which there is no possibility of the transferred information putting Company A in

an advantageous position with respect to Company B, and in which in fact the only transfer of "information" is in the limited sense that the original process started a chain

of ideas in James' thinking that finally led to a new and creative process for Company B.

 

Third, after enumerating the morally relevant similarities and differences in the various cases, you must determine the line of demarcation between transfers of information

that should and should not be proprietary. In some instances this may be relatively easy to do, but in others no precise point of demarcation may present itself. This should

not be surprising. Although we all recognize a difference between day and night, it may be difficult to say just when the point of transition from "day" to "night" occurs. Is

it at 6:00 p.m.? Is it when we have to turn on the lights on our car? Is it when the evening news begins on T.V.? Is it when a trained observer can see the first star? Is it

when a person with 20/20 vision can no longer see more than 20 feet ahead?

 

There may, of course, be different criteria for different purposes, but it is important to see that a certain amount of arbitrariness may be involved in setting the precise

boundaries. This is not necessarily troublesome. It is no different from the situation in which we are attempting to find the point of demarcation between day and night.

There is a clear difference between day and night, and there are many times which are either clearly day or clearly night. Nevertheless the precise point of demarcation may

have to be established by convention. In the case of proprietary information, these conventions are ultimately established by the courts. The conventions established by the

courts may or may not be the most desirable from a moral standpoint, but in other areas there are no such conventions. In many cases, these conventions should be

established by the professional community--for example, in determining how safe is safe enough.

 

Resolving Conflict Problems

 

Sue has a problem. A compound emitted from the stack of the plant where she is employed has been linked by several studies to respiratory problems which can be severe

in a small percentage of the population. The compound has not been regulated by the EPA, perhaps because it is relatively rare in industrial processes. Its elimination will

be expensive, and it may force the elimination of the product line that produces the questionable compound. This would lead to the elimination of a number of jobs in a

small community which is heavily dependent on the plant for employment for its citizens. An added dimension is that the product line could become very successful in the

future, thus adding jobs in the community, which is in need of more sources of employment.

 

Sue's supervisor instructs her not to bring up the issue in hearings with EPA officials. He believes he has a good chance of delaying any final action on the issue for

several years at least, and by that time a modification in the process may eliminate the compound. He argues that the evidence for the health problems supposedly produced

by the compound is questionable, and that the health problems are not fatal in any case. "I'm going to fight them as long as I can on this one," he says. How should Sue

respond?

 

Sue finds herself in a conflict problem, pulled by two opposing obligations, both of which find justification in her professional code. On the one hand, the first

Fundamental Canon" of the code of ethics of the National Society of Professional Engineers (NSPE) says: "Engineers shall hold paramount the safety, health and welfare

of the public in the performance of their professional duties." On the other hand, the fourth Fundamental Canon of the NSPE code says, "Engineers shall act in

professional matters for each employer or client as faithful agents or trustees."

 

Furthermore, the obligation to the public itself pulls her in two different directions. Sue rightly believes she has an obligation to protect the physical health of the

community. But doesn't she have an obligation to be concerned with the economic health of the community as well? In fact, if the people of the community were asked to

give advice to Sue, they would probably side with the manager in advocating that the new product line be continued, with its promise of more jobs and wealth for the

community. They would do this, even though they would also be the ones most likely to suffer from the respiratory problems. This being the case, does Sue have a right to

act in a paternalistic way toward her fellow employees, deciding that their economic well-being is not as important as their health?

 

Conflicts between competing obligations, both of which appear to be valid, are common features of the moral life. The conflicts that give us trouble are not those between

good and bad, but between competing goods, both of which cannot be fully realized. How should we approach such conflicts? Let us consider several ways in which

conflict problems can be resolved.

 

(1) Finding the Creative Middle Way. When faced with two conflicting obligations, both of which appear to be justified, one approach is to try to find a way to satisfy both

of them. While it is often not possible to satisfy both moral requirements in their original form, sometimes it is possible to satisfy them in a modified form. Now this may

not seem possible, but we must not forget that most general moral rules have an "all other things being equal" qualification implicitly attached to them. Thus the first

Fundamental Canon of the NSPE code should probably read, "All other things being equal, engineers shall hold paramount the safety, health and welfare of the public in

the performance of their professional duties." But all things are often not equal. For example, the threat to the safety, health and welfare of the public may be both uncertain

and minimal. That is, (1) whether or not the emissions are in fact harmful may itself be a matter of controversy, and (2) there is of yet no evidence that the emissions

produce fatal diseases, only significant respiratory problems in a certain small percentage of the population. Furthermore, as we have seen, the obligation to the community

may include an obligation to its economic well-being. So the question is what in this case is Sue's obligation to the public.

 

This is not to say that Sue should unreservedly follow the instructions of her supervisor, for the same problem of specifying how the canon applies may apply to the Fourth

Canon as well. What does it mean to act as "faithful agents and trustees" of one's employer? It cannot mean that the engineer is obliged to obey the employer no matter

what the employer directs him to do. Virtually everyone would agree that an employee is not obligated to commit murder for an employer. Most people would probably

agree that an employee does not have an obligation to vote in elections in accordance with what company management considers to be its own best interests. Many would

agree that employees do not have to observe a lifestyle that the employer considers "appropriate" for its employees. However, most would probably agree that the employee

does have an obligation to be faithful and punctual in work attendance, to devote his energy and attention to the work assigned, and not to steal company property or use

company property without permission.

 

The most obvious criterion for separating legitimate obligations of employees from illegitimate obligations is that the employee has an obligation to perform his assigned

function in the workplace and not to do in his or her private life what interferes in a clear and direct way with on-the-job performance, unless a violation of an obligation to

the public is involved. But one of the obligations to the public is surely protecting the health and safety of the public. This further explanation of the two norms means that

they can be reconciled.

 

According to these further specifications of the two guiding norms, if a product is a serious threat to the safety and health of the public and the employer orders the engineer

to conceal this information, the engineer is obligated to disobey the employer, even if the employer is not breaking any law by concealing danger.

 

However, the requirement for acting as "faithful agents and trustees" of the employer does seem to imply at least two limits on the actions of the employee. The first

limitation is that the engineer should make his protests in as responsible a manner a possible. This requires respecting the corporate hierarchy where possible and making

the protests in a private and non-confrontational way, if possible. The engineer should do everything possible to avoid embarrassing the employer and give the employer

the opportunity to correct the problem, insofar as consideration of the well-being of the public permits. The second limitation is that the employee not protest minor risks to

the health and safety of the public, if these are in what we might call the normal range of risk.

 

There is an obvious way to minimize the conflict of these two norms. If there were a complaint mechanism whereby employees could register ethical concerns in a way that

would be confidential and not embarrassing to the company, these two norms could be reconciled. If there is no such mechanism, Sue should try to find some way of

raising her concerns to higher management in a confidential manner.

 

It is important to keep in mind that the encouragement to finding a creative middle way between the two norms is not necessarily a moral compromise. Remember that the

two norms have great importance from a moral standpoint. If it is possible to still rise the concerns while not directly confronting her manager, Sue should probably take

this option. The purpose of moral thinking is not to produce martyrs, but to satisfy as many moral concerns as possible.

 

(2) Employing Lower-Level Considerations. Let us suppose that Sue is unsuccessful in bringing her concerns to the attention of higher management. She feels,

furthermore, that her obligation to be a "faithful agent and trustee" of her employer and her obligation to refrain from unnecessarily jeopardizing the jobs of other employees

is about evenly balanced against the obligation to protect the public from a somewhat harmful emission. How can she decide?

 

Sometimes it is permissible in such situations to take into account considerations that might seem to be less relevant otherwise. Suppose you are considering hiring two

engineers, one who is more skilled in one area and one in another. When the qualifications are evenly balanced in this way, you might be justified in bringing in other

considerations which would not otherwise be relevant, such as the fact that one of the engineers is an avid tennis player. Since you also play tennis several times a week,

you decide to choose the person who would make a good tennis partner. Such a consideration would not ordinarily be relevant, but in this case it might be.

 

Now carry this same situation over to Sue's case. If Sue really believes that her obligations are evenly balanced in this case, it may be justifiable to take into consideration

which option is most likely to promote her career advancement. This is not to say that she has failed to consider her own well-being all along. After all, she is one of the

employees who might loose her job if the plant closed. But if she observes her professional obligations as outlined in the NSPE code, she will not have made her personal

well-being the decisive factor. Now, however, she may be justified in doing just that.

 

(3) Making the Hard Choice. It may not always be possible to reconcile opposing obligations or to drop down to a lower-level consideration. Sometimes no creative middle

way is possible. For example, Sue may find that all the managers she approaches are unsympathetic to her concerns. She may also become convinced that the danger posed

by the new emission is substantially more severe than she had at first supposed. In this case she may have to bring the issue before the EPA. She may be forced to make a

hard choice.


 

Moral Concepts And Theories

 

(ESSAY #3)

 

Introduction

 

In considering issues in engineering ethics, a distinction is sometimes made between morals and ethics. When this distinction is made, the term morals is taken to refer to

generally accepted standards of right and wrong in a society and the term ethics is taken to refer to more abstract principles which might appear in a code of professional

ethics or in a textbook in ethical theory. However, the terms moral philosophy or moral theory would refer to a set of abstract moral principles as appropriately as the

term ethics, so it may be more practical to use the words interchangeably. Both of the terms refer to standards of right conduct and the judgments of particular actions as

right or wrong by those standards.

 

Moral and ethical statements must be distinguished from two other types of statements, namely those in etiquette and those in law. Referring to a rule of etiquette, we might

say, "You should compliment your host or hostess after a good meal ." Here we have used the word should, and this suggests that we have made an ethical judgment.

However, there are at least two important differences between statements of etiquette and statements of ethics. First, moral and ethical statements are generally thought to

have greater importance than statements of etiquette. Most of us probably feel that a violation of a rule such as "An engineer should protect the safety of the public" is much

more serious than a violation of a rule such as "You should not eat peas with your knife." A second difference between ethics and etiquette is that ethical norms cannot be

changed by books of rules or by authoritative bodies, but rules of etiquette may be.

 

Moral and ethical statements should also be distinguished from laws. The fact that an action is legally permissible does not establish that it is morally and ethically

permissible. Suppose an engineer discovers that her company is emitting a substance into the atmosphere that is not currently regulated by the Environmental Protection

Agency (EPA). Suppose further that the engineer reads some scientific literature that indicates the pollutant causes respiratory problems and may cause other more serious

health problems. Should she reveal this information to the EPA? Whatever your views on this matter, it is clear that the mere fact that emitting the substance is legally

permissible does not also mean it is morally permissible to do so. It does not settle the question as to what the engineer should do.

 

Just as legality does not imply morality, illegality does not imply immorality. It would be illegal to introduce very small amounts of a chemical into the atmosphere if doing

so violates EPA standards, but one might make a good argument that there are cases in which it is not immoral to do so and that in fact the EPA standards in this case are

too strict and fail to balance costs and benefits in a rational way.

 

If we wanted to draw a Venn diagram of the relationship between law and morality, it might look like the diagram on the following page. The shaded area covers those

actions that are both legal and moral. The light areas cover those actions that are legal and not moral or that are moral and not legal.

 

Three Kinds of Statements in Ethics

 

People often think of ethical reasoning as fuzzy and imprecise, and it is certainly true that the qualitative thinking that goes on in ethics is not susceptible to the same kind of

precision that can be achieved in mathematics. Often, however, ethical thinking is unnecessarily confused, and much of this confusion is due to the failure to distinguish

between three kinds of statements that are made in ethics.1

 

Factual statements are either true or false and refer to claims that can be confirmed or refuted by empirical observation. The claim that a product will produce accidents

because of faulty design is a factual claim, although it can be crucial in a moral debate. For example, two engineers could agree on the moral principle that unsafe products

should not be put on the market, but disagree as to whether Product X will produce accidents. We might describe this disagreement as to whether Product X should be

marketed as a disagreement over professional ethics, but actually the disagreement hinges on different factual claims. Factual claims can be as controversial as moral claims,

and it is absolutely crucial in a moral disagreement to first determine whether there is a disagreement over facts.

 

Conceptual statements are statements about the meaning or scope of certain terms. Discussions of conceptual issues can be very important in ethics. The best-known

example of a conceptual issue is the question whether the fetus should be considered a human person. This depends on how we define the term person, and many people

believe the abortion debate hinges on this definition. The definition cannot be settled by appeal to facts about the fetus, although these facts may influence our definition of

person.

 

To take an example from engineering, let us suppose an American engineer is employed by a company that is doing business in a foreign country. A representative of a

foreign firm tells the engineer that his product will not be considered for purchase unless the representative is given a substantial payment. Since the representative is not a

government official, the payment would not be illegal under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The engineer believes that paying bribes is wrong, but considers this to be

paying extortion rather than a bribe. He defines bribery as paying money to get a person to give special (and inappropriate) consideration to his product. He defines

extortion as demanding money to do what one ought to (do or not to do) anyhow. Thus paying money to get the representative to consider your product, when he ought to

consider it anyhow, is paying extortion, not bribery. Since he believes bribery is wrong but paying extortion is not wrong, he pays the fee to the representative.

 

 

 

 

1

 

 

 

Venn Diagram on the Relationship of Law and Morality

 

In this example, you could disagree with the engineer's moral evaluation of bribery and extortion. You could also disagree with him regarding his definitions of bribery and

extortion. Both of these disagreements might be called moral disagreements in a broad sense, but only the second is a moral disagreement in the strict sense. The first kind

of disagreement is a conceptual disagreement. Thus we have a wider and narrower sense of the term moral.

 

Moral statements are statements that something is right or wrong. There can, of course, be disagreement over moral statements. We have just mentioned an example of a

genuine moral disagreement, namely the disagreement over whether it is wrong to pay extortion. There are many other examples of genuine moral disagreements. For

example, some people may not believe it is wrong to pay bribes in a country where this practice is generally accepted. Engineers may disagree over the morality of killing

civilians, so that one engineer could work on a particular defense contract in good conscience and another could not. You can probably think of many other areas where

two people can have genuine moral disagreements.

 

In discussing factual disagreements, appeal is made to factual or empirical considerations. In considering conceptual disagreements, arguments are presented about the

appropriateness of one definition as opposed to another. In evaluating moral disagreements, appeals are made to broader and more basic moral principles. These principles

are often organized into moral theories.

 

Moral Theories

 

In making judgments about right conduct, most of us recognize the value of moral consistency. The requirements of consistency take several different forms. (1) If a

consulting engineer breaks confidentiality with her client because it is in her interest to do so but condemns another engineer for doing the same thing, we are inclined to

say that she is inconsistent. She is not applying the same standards to herself that she expects everyone else to follow. (2) We also expect a person to be consistent with her

own moral standards. If she keeps strict confidentiality one time and breaks it another time, even when there is no important difference between the two cases, we again say

that she is inconsistent. (3) Finally, our moral beliefs must be consistent with one another. Our moral beliefs about confidentiality must be consistent with our beliefs about

bribery, whistleblowing, and the environment. Ultimately, we must know how our moral beliefs in professional ethics relate to our beliefs about abortion, the moral

justification of racial and sexual quotas in hiring, euthanasia, and any other moral issue.

 

One way to think consistently in this way is to have a moral theory, i.e. a set of moral principles which systematically link moral beliefs to one another by means of a set of

coherent moral principles. A theory in any area offers the opportunity to define terms in uniform ways and to relate a set of ideas to one another in a consistent manner.

Moral theory does the same thing with moral ideas.

 

A moral theory can be conveniently divided into three parts. First, there is a moral standard, a criterion or test of what is right or wrong. It has the general form:

 

"Those actions are right that possess characteristic X."

 

Thus, those and only those actions are right that possess some characteristic X. We could fill in X by a phrase such as, "producing the greatest total amount of human

well-being" or "equally respect the humanity of each person." Obviously these expressions need further definition. What do we mean by human well-being? What do we

mean by respect for the humanity of each person? These questions would have to be answered in an adequate moral theory.

 

Second, moral principles serve to categorize different types of actions as right or wrong. Moral principles have the following form:

 

"Those actions of type Y are right (or wrong)."

 

Such actions are right because they conform to the moral standard by possessing characteristic X or wrong because they fail to conform. Examples of moral principles

would be, "Bribery is wrong" and "Killing innocent people is wrong." These practices might be wrong because they fail to promote human well-being or because they fail

to respect the humanity of each person. In any case, they serve to show the implications of the moral standard for a broad class of actions.

 

Third, moral judgments are statements about the rightness or wrongness of particular actions. Moral judgments have the following form:

 

"Action Z is right (or wrong)."

 

Examples of moral judgments would be "John should not have bribed the foreign official to buy his product" or "John should not have agreed to work on the defense

contract" or "Jane was right to have refused to sign that design." Moral judgments apply moral standards or moral principles to specific situations. They are thus the

ultimate goal of moral reasoning.

 

Earlier, the need to test our moral views for overall moral consistency was given as one of the driving forces behind the search for a moral theory. From this standpoint it

would be desirable to have a single moral theory in which all of our views could be encapsulated. However, moral philosophers have generally concluded that it is not

possible to incorporate all of the moral views that are generally accepted in our culture into a single coherent moral theory. Rather, there seem to be two systems of moral

concepts that are the most influential, although there are considerable areas of overlap. These two theories are utilitarianism and the ethics of respect for persons. Let us

consider each of these.

 

Utilitarianism

 

The moral standard of utilitarianism is:

 

Those actions are right that produce the greatest total amount of human well-being.

 

Utilitarianism has great intuitive appeal to many people because human well-being seems to be such a natural goal of human endeavor. In order to be plausible, however,

utilitarians must define well-being. Yet people define well-being, or what some might call the "good life," in different ways. For some it is physical pleasure, for others

financial and professional success, and so forth. How do we resolve these conflicts?

 

One of the solutions that is most widely accepted by utilitarians is called preference utilitarianism. According to preference utilitarianism, those conditions are promoted that

allow each individual within society to pursue happiness as he or she defines it. Each individual may use his or her own preferences as a guide to action. But of course each

person must also promote those conditions that allow others to pursue their own preferences. So, from the utilitarian perspective, each person has a double obligation: to

maximize his own well-being, however this is defined, but only insofar as this is compatible with promoting those conditions that enable others to maximize their own

well-being, however they define it. Only in this way will the utilitarian ideal be realized.

 

At least two conditions must be met if an individual is to pursue her well-being. First, each individual must have the maximum degree of personal freedom; only in this way

can she pursue well-being as she defines it. Second, she must enjoy the basic conditions of existence necessary to realize well-being, however it is defined. The most

obvious such conditions are the conditions of physical well-being. For example, nobody can pursue their well-being if they are sick and cannot obtain medical care, or if

they are subjected to unsafe working conditions, or are subjected to risk due to toxic emissions. Many non-physical conditions are also required for most people to realize

their well-being, such as education and companionship.

 

A utilitarian analysis of a moral problem consists of three steps.

 

1. The utilitarian must determine the audience of the action or policy in question--those people who will be affected for good or ill.

 

2. The positive and negative effects of the alternative actions or policies must be determined.

 

3. The utilitarian must decide which course of action produces the greatest overall utility.

 

The utilitarian ideal is a persuasive one and has been very influential in individual morality and public policy in America in the twentieth century. It is an essential

perspective in engineering ethics, where technological decisions are often made in terms of cost/benefit or risk/benefit analysis. These types of analysis are simply

applications of utilitarianism. However, there are two major drawbacks to the utilitarian perspective on morality.

 

First, implementation of the utilitarian perspective requires extensive knowledge of facts, and sometimes this knowledge is not available. This is especially evident in the

case of cost/benefit and risk/benefit analysis. In order to balance the cost or negative utility of an engineering project, such as the Aswan Dam in Egypt, against the benefit

or positive utility, we must be able to calculate the long-term effects of the project on all the members of the audience. This requires an enormous amount of knowledge,

some of which we do not have. Insofar as we do not know the long-term positive and negative consequences of an action or policy, we do not know how to evaluate it

from a utilitarian perspective. Sometimes utilitarians are reduced to a "best guess" approach, and this is obviously not very satisfactory.

 

The second problem with utilitarianism is that it can lead to injustice for certain individuals. A mining operation that is unsafe and leads to black lung disease for some of

the miners may produce more utility than harm, from an overall standpoint, but it may be unjust to the miners themselves. Maximizing utility at the expense of individuals

produces serious ethical problems which utilitarian theory is not well-equipped to handle. The next theory is more satisfying in this regard.

 

The Ethics of Respect for Persons

 

The moral standard of the ethics of respect for persons or RP morality can be stated as follows:

 

Those actions are right that equally respect each human person as a moral agent.

 

A moral agent is an individual capable of both formulating and pursuing purposes of his or her own and of being responsible for the actions taken to fulfill those purposes.

Thus moral agents must be distinguished from things, such as knives or shovels, which exist to fulfill purposes imposed on them by moral agents.

 

The emphasis on respect for each individual is expressed in the Golden Rule: "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you." This moral maxim is found in one

form or another in most major religious traditions. It forces a person to consider others by imaginatively placing himself or herself in the position of other members who

could be affected by his or her actions.

 

The Golden Rule is an excellent rule of thumb in many practical moral deliberations. However, it can lead to seemingly perverse results, sometimes because it seems too

permissive and sometimes because it seems too restrictive. Suppose an engineer who has a rather carefree attitude toward danger participates in the design of an automobile

which is relatively inexpensive and fun to drive, but whose advantages are purchased at the prices of safety. He might justify participating in the design by saying (quite

honestly) he would be willing to drive the car himself. While designing the car might be justified by the Golden Rule, we might still find problems with it from an ethical

standpoint. Or perhaps an engineer orders the dumping of small amounts of chemicals into the local river, even though there is some evidence that the material may pose

health problems. She justifies her action by saying, "I fish in the river and eat the fish myself. I would be perfectly willing for other plants to do what our plant does." Her

action might be justified by the Golden Rule, but we might wonder about its moral permissibility.

 

In the above examples, the Golden Rule seems too permissive, but sometimes it seems too restrictive. Suppose an engineer discovers gross incompetence on the part of

one of his fellow engineers, but refuses to report him on the grounds that he would not want to be reported (and probably loose his job as a consequence) if he were in a

similar situation. Here the Golden Rule seems to prohibit actions that we might consider to be morally permissible or even morally required.

 

In order to provide a more precise and objective guideline for respecting the moral agency of individuals, some moral philosophers have appealed to a doctrine of rights. A

right may be defined as an entitlement to act or to have another individual act in a certain way. Rights serve as a protective barrier, shielding individuals from the unjustified

infringements of others. The rights necessary to implement the ethics of respect for persons are the rights to freedom and those physical and non-physical conditions

necessary to realize one's well-being as he or she defines it.

 

In RP morality, these basic rights may not be sacrificed for the greater overall utility. One individual's (or group's) rights may be overridden to protect another individual's

(or group's) rights that are considered to be more basic, but not merely to provide greater utility for the other individual or for the group. This is the most important

difference between RP morality and utilitarianism.

 

If an individual's rights may be overridden only to protect a more fundamental or basic right of another individual, those rights that are most fundamental must be known.

This requirement calls for a hierarchy of rights. Philosopher Alan Gewirth has proposed a three-tiered hierarchy of rights. The first tier includes the most basic rights, the

essential preconditions of action: life, physical integrity, and mental health. The second tier includes rights to maintaining the level of purpose-fulfillment an individual has

already achieved. This tier includes the right not to be deceived or cheated, to have one's possessions stolen, to be defamed, or to suffer broken promises. The third tier

includes those rights necessary to increase one's level of purpose-fulfillment. It includes the right to such things as property, self-respect, and nondiscrimination.2

 

To apply RP morality, follow this sequence:

 

1. Determine the audience of the action or policy. The audience whose rights are affected would ordinarily be the same as the audience under the utilitarian analysis.

 

2. Evaluate the seriousness of the rights infringements each action will impose.

 

3. The course of action that produces the least serious rights infringements must be chosen.

 

Rights-infringements can be measured in three dimensions. First, some rights are more basic than others. A right to life, for example, is more basic than the right to

property. Second, an action that abrogates a right altogether is more serious than one that merely limits it. Taking away all of an individual's property, for example, is a

more serious rights-infringement than taking away only some of it.Third, there is a difference between an actual and a merely potential rights-infringement. An action that

actually produces a disease, for example, is a more serious rights-infringement than one that merely increases the risk of having it.

 

There are two principal difficulties with RP morality. First, it is sometimes difficult to apply in a way that leads to a clear conclusion. In some cases, any alternative open to

an engineer may involve interference with an individual's or company's rights, and it may not always be clear which rights should have priority. This is especially true if

the rights violations are merely potential rather than actual or if the action is only a slight infringement on a right. Suppose a pollutant is introduced into the atmosphere

which has been shown to cause mild respiratory problems in some people. However, installing the pollution control devices necessary to stop the emission will be so

expensive that the plant may be forced to close and many jobs will be lost in an economically depressed community. What does RP morality tell us to do here? It is clear

that the hierarchy of rights is not sufficient to resolve the dilemma. The threat to health might be considered a threat to a basic right, but the threat to this basic right is not an

extremely serious one. The threat to economic well-being might be considered a threat to a second-tier right, but the threat to this right is more serious and more certain and

may affect a larger number of people. The methodology so far presented does not present adequate grounds for resolving such dilemmas.

 

A second problem with RP morality is that moral judgments implied by it sometimes appear implausible because they conflict so strongly with overall welfare or utility.

Products can always be made more safe with the expenditure of greater amounts of money. Automobiles could be made safer if they cost $100,000 each, but few people

could afford to buy them. The decision to construct cheaper automobiles means that a number of individuals will die who otherwise might not die, so that the basic right to

life of these individuals will be violated. Yet most people are probably inclined to believe that the decision to produce cheaper but less safe automobiles is the right one, and

this decision is most easily justified from a utilitarian perspective.

 

Conclusion

 

Our review of the two most important moral theories leads to the following conclusions.

 

First, it is probably impossible to unite all of our moral beliefs into a single coherent theory. Utilitarianism requires us to maximize the total amount of preference

satisfaction, even if it means doing an injustice to individuals. RP morality requires us to respect the rights of individuals, even if it means promoting something less than

the total amount of preference satisfaction.

 

Second, given this fundamental divergence between the two theories, it is often best to analyze a complex moral problem from the standpoint of both moral theories. If the

two theories converge on the same conclusion, we can have some assurance about the proper course of action. If the two theories do not converge, a decision must be

made as to which conclusion has priority. In general, moral philosophers have adopted the view that RP considerations should take priority over utilitarian considerations,

except in those instances where the violation of rights is relatively minor.

 

Third, in addition to conflicts between the two theories, many problems that arise within a given theory are not adequately treated by the theories as they have been

presented. These problems fall into two broad categories. which we can call relevance problems and conflict problems. These concepts are discussed in Essay #2.

 

Engineering Design

 

Literature On Social Responsibility Versus Legal Liability

 

(ESSAY #4)

 

Introduction

 

Litigation associated with engineering design has escalated enormously over the last few decades. It has increased the intensity of debates over the question whether social

responsibility or legal liability should have priority. Where does a design engineer and his/her company's responsibility end and the subcontractor's, manufacturer's and

consumer's begin? The relationship between social responsibility and legal liability is complicated by the fact that laws are usually enacted only after a disaster. How can an

engineering firm justify its actions based on current legal definitions? If a company's design has adverse affects on the public welfare, of necessity laws are enacted to

ensure that appropriate safety standards are met. Or, at the very least, legal suits are filed so injured parties can be compensated and the culprits penalized. This

phenomenon has become particularly critical regarding litigation involving engineering design and product liability.

 

The public has become increasingly aware that the benefits of industrial progress must be balanced against the growing need to protect the public from damages caused by

some products and by-products of technology. Naturally, the spirited public debate puts engineers at the center of the controversy between product safety and social

responsibility on the one hand and legal liability on the other.1

 

How should we determine the engineer's and his/her company's social responsibility? Is it not their job to act as society's protector? Should social responsibility not

precede any discussion of legal liability? And should a design engineer not take every precaution to ensure that his/her company's product is safe before it enters the

market? Safety must be an essential design consideration, for as Christopher D. Stone notes in his Where the Law Ends: The Social Control of Corporate

Behavior,

 

Even if we put aside the defects in the impact of the sanctions, there still remains the problem that law is primarily a reactive institution. Lawmakers have to appreciate and

respond to problems that corporate engineers, chemists, and financiers were anticipating (or should have anticipated) long beforethat the drugs their corporations are about

to produce can alter consciousness or damage the gene pool of the human race, that they are on the verge of multinational expansion that will endow them with the power to

trigger worldwide financial crises in generally unforeseen ways, and so on. Even if laws could be passed to deal effectively with these dangers, until they are passed a great

deal of damagesome perhaps irreversiblecan be done. Thus, there is something grotesqueand socially dangerousin encouraging corporate managers to believe that, until the

law tells them otherwise, they have no responsibilities beyond the law and their impulses (whether their impulses spring from the id or from the balance sheet). We do not

encourage human beings to suppose so. And the dangers to society seem all the more acute where corporations are concerned.2

 

Social Responsibility for Public Safety An Overview

 

With corporate decision-making structures as the focus, we find that many of the difficult ethical choices corporate managers and design engineers must make involve

conflicts regarding who is responsible for a given activity. Managers and engineers alike have different obligations depending on their role within the corporation. Thus,

one of the obligations at issue is role morality, which is concerned with duties individuals have, based on the specific roles they have assumed within the corporation. For

legal scholars, "Corporate role morality takes as given precisely what classical moral theory wishes to evaluate, the worthiness of the duties assigned by one's role."3

Unfortunately, one of the pressing problems in legal scholarship on corporate social morality involves the fact that as laws change, so do the roles within the corporate

hierarchy. Thus, there is a need for individuals within corporations to take a more active interest in their obligations as professionals, as well as to protect society at large.

In many instances, engineers will simply have to choose their social responsibility over the law.

 

An engineer must often place his/her social responsibility over the objectives of his/her employer. "Just as we must know the rules of baseball to know what to do with the

ball, so we must know engineering ethics to know, for example, whether, as engineers, we should merely weigh safety against the wishes of our employer or instead

give safety preference over those wishes."4 Sometimes a cost/benefit analysis is not enough, especially when lives are at stake.

 

In his "Explaining Wrongdoing," Michael Davis emphasizes the need for professionals to distance themselves from a "microscopic" way of looking at their role within the

corporation, to look up from their given tasks and role obligations to see the larger implications of the work they perform for society. In essence, Davis argues that

problems associated with professional ethics center on these fundamental questions of social obligation. Using the famous Challenger disaster as a case study, Davis shows

that while no one broke the law, there was clearly wrongdoing on the part of Morton Thiokol's managers and engineers. "For an engineer, safety is the paramount

consideration. The engineers could not say the launch would be safe. So, Lund should have delayed the launch. Seven people died, in part at least, because he did not do

what, as an engineer, he was supposed to do."5 This is not simply limited to highly publicized disasters. In all fields of engineering, concern over safety, and the

engineer's responsibility for ensuring it, is being emphasized. In his "SafetyAn Important Responsibility," Carlton Robinson argues that safety is an especially critical

factor for transport engineers and their managers. Given the volume of traffic on roads, safety must come before cost considerations in highway design and construction.

Carlton argues that if, at present, increased safety is not the primary goal in engineering design and construction projects, it should be.6 Safety is a social, not primarily a

legal obligation, and engineers and their managers must always keep their obligations to the public welfare at the forefront when making design and management decisions.

 

Another example of the importance of choosing social responsibility over the law involves the Soldier of Fortune guns-for-hire classified advertising cases. In his

article, Don Tomlinson asks, What are we first: professionals or human beings? While placing guns-for-hire advertisements was not illegal, it was immoral, and people

died because of the advertisements. Soldier of Fortune acted irresponsibly toward the public, and "Law cannot shield anyone from the most basic duty all human beings

owe all other human beings: respect for life. Law and ethics are not one and the same. Further, using law as a justification for conduct which is socially irresponsible is

socially irresponsible itself."7 The same duties apply to engineering design and management.

 

Quality engineering is an imperative. Thus, there is a need for responsible management of design projects, both in terms of ethical and creative engineering and corporate

practice. The American Society of Civil Engineering Code of Ethics states that "engineers must hold the public safety, welfare, and health paramount and use our

knowledge and skill for the enhancement of human welfare."8 When engineers, managers, and their companies' corporate owners, as well as contractors, subcontractors

and inspectors, take pride in and responsibility for their designs, the entire engineering profession benefits. According to Charlton Moorman, ethical engineering practice

positively affects engineering creativity, and the "engineering profession benefits when ethics are followed and creativity is used by the engineer. When not followed, bad

public relations are a possibility for the engineer, the company employing the engineer and the profession in general."9

 

As such, professional engineering societies play a significant role in ensuring that safety standards are maintained, and it is imperative that individual professional engineers

adhere to what his/her society mandates. Michael Davis notes that in thinking like an engineer, one must remember the place of a code of ethics in the practice of his/her

profession:

 

Engineers should not only do as their profession's code requires, but should also support it less directly by encouraging others to do as it requires and by criticizing,

ostracizing, or otherwise calling to account those who do not. They should support their profession's code in these ways for at least four reasons: First, engineers should

support their profession's code because supporting it will help protect them and those they care about from being injured by what other engineers do. Second, supporting

the code will also help assure each engineer a working environment in which it will be easier than it would otherwise be to resist pressures to do much that the engineer

would rather not do. Third, engineers should support their profession's code because supporting it helps make their profession a practice of which they need not feel

morally justified embarrassment, shame, or guilt. And fourth, one has an obligation of fairness to do his part insofar as he claims to be an engineer and other engineers are

doing their part in generating these benefits for all engineers.10

 

Sometimes, however, despite engineers' meeting their design obligations, failures still occur. What is the engineer's responsibility once the design is handed off to a

contractor, subcontractor or the consumer? Is the designer liable for aiding others in the use of a product? What criteria can the engineer invoke? In his "Charity and the

Duty to Rescue," John Whelan says, "there is not a duty to aid; however, many failures to aid deserve moral criticism; and some of them deserve very serious moral

criticism."11 He notes that one must distinguish between morally objectionable failures to aid and those which are merely failures of consideration. They are

distinguishable by knowing what the obligations of the rescuer (or in this case, the engineer) are. "Knowledge (or any reasonable belief)...is relevant to any obligation.

...what matters[; however,] is whether you can do something about it."12 In determining whether you are obligated to do something to prevent harm to others, two of his

six rules apply directly to engineering design: 1) that there is sufficient professional reason to believe that you can prevent unreasonable danger at little cost to yourself; and

2) that you do not have sufficient reason to believe someone else can prevent harm if you do not.13 This raises serious questions about what constitutes safety and the

concept of unreasonable danger as a design consideration.

 

One of the problems is that engineers are often not trained to look at notions of "unreasonably dangerous products" conceptually. D. Muster uses the analogy of medical

health practitioners to encourage a forensic approach to engineering. "Some engineers tend to ignore design considerations that cannot be quantified easily for analysis or,

at least, they consider them to be of less importance than others which lend themselves readily to being modelled and analysed."14 For Muster, the real problem engineers

face is that they are not properly educated in product liability law and the legal concept of an "unreasonably dangerous product," so they do not fully appreciate when they

are ethically obligated to assist others in the product chain.

 

Strict liability for a defective product falls into three categories, and all three are significant in the chain: design, manufacturing, and marketing. In particular, Muster notes

that "A marketing defect is synonymous with the failure of a manufacturer to give adequate warnings and instructions for the proper use of his product."15 This is also true

for the designer. When looking at whether there was an "unreasonable" danger, courts test the product as to whether it was: 1.) state-of-the-art, 2.) an unavoidably unsafe

product, 3.) misconducted by the user, or 4.) misused with the foreseeability of the specific misuse at issue in the suit.

 

Like the other authors, Muster argues that safety is an essential design consideration. Given all the educational programs and literature available to engineers, "no designer

can claim the information on which to base a safe design is unavailable."16 He further notes, as Stone does, that most design changes are directly attributable to product

liability litigation, and that safe products lead to good business practice. Thus, safety is deemed as the absence of unreasonable danger. Anything short of that can be

considered morally unacceptable. Yet, morally unacceptable conduct continues apace, as the amount of litigation escalates. What are the consequences for the engineering

profession?

 

Legal and Social Consequences for the Engineering Profession

 

As stated above, claims against design professionals and their companies are on the increase. Even if the professional engineer feels he/she has done everything to avoid

"unreasonable" danger, accidents happen, and designers are increasingly held liable for construction and product mishaps. Engineers must, therefore, familiarize

themselves with the legal doctrines of informed consent, novel tort remedies and reforms, third-party liability issues, liability insurance, and legislative lobbying

techniques.

 

The legal doctrine of informed consent is based on tort law. In "A History and Theory of Informed Consent," a "tort" is defined as "a civil injury to one's person or

property that is intentionally or negligently inflicted by another and that is measured in terms of, and compensated by, money damages."17 Any failure to obtain informed

consent in situations where it is legally required is considered a "tort." While the book deals almost exclusively with medical ethics, the implications for engineering

designers is clear.

 

In recent years, a novel theory of tort remedy, the "Hedonic tort," is gaining momentum, as litigation shows there is a widespread need both to do more than just

cost-benefit analyses on products and to reevaluate corporate marketing strategies. The "Hedonic tort" remedy considers as its base the theory of individual happiness, and

its attributes include "quality of life factors such as environmental standards, quality of education, weather, and the amounts of time spent pursuing vocations."18

According to Jack Karns, individual happiness is based on three factors: "a. degree of moral virtue, b. degree of good fortune with which the individual is blessed, and c.

[and most important for the design engineer's consideration] whether a tragic choice is made based on circumstances beyond someone's control."19 Hedonic damage suits

could conceivably ruin a professional's reputation, and her financial well being. Thus, this theory of tort remedy could have significant impacts on product design,

incorporating additional safety features in order to minimize such damage claims.

 

One of the problems associated with tort reform, however, is the issue of insurance. Because claims have increased substantially, battles over reform have escalated since

the early 1980's. As Dennis Schapker notes, many firms have responded to these increased claims by dropping their insurance coverage. As of 1990, 21% of all design

firms were uninsured. This percentage of uninsured firms does not bode well for the engineering profession as a whole. Thus, he argues that design professionals must get

involved in the debate over tort reform.20 This call to action rises as designers are increasingly being held responsible for negligence in their work, including that of their

subcontractor's, despite written contract disclaimers aimed at defending their interests. Civil Engineering notes that "the privity of contract defense is no longer an

absolute shield that design professionals may use to protect themselves from liability to third parties."21 Thus, engineers must understand tort law and liability insurance as

never before.

 

While insurance is not a remedy for unprofessional behavior, engineers must know more about it. In his case study of an insurance carrier, Randall Horne notes that,

"With the ever-increasing tendency toward litigation, clients have begun to view their design professional's liability insurance as a potential source of full reimbursement

for any damages they may incur."22 This can be a paralyzing concept for the engineer, to say the very least. Claims against designers result not only in financial loss, but

also a loss of prestige, good will among clients and future business. "Although it may be difficult to assign a monetary value to these losses, it is not difficult to imagine

that they could be career or at least business threatening."23

 

Thus, engineers must get involved, as must their societies. The nature of engineering in the United States means that each state can create unique laws governing the

practice of engineering. This has resulted in a liability crisis of the first order. While most recognize the need for engineers to place their social responsibility over issues of

legal liability, many petty law suits make practicing as a professional a risky venture. If engineers get involved in the debate over legal liability, perhaps they can spend

more time policing themselves, and less time in the court room. Mark Friedlander, a liability attorney, argues that engineers and their societies must acquire the requisite

knowledge about liability issues, and then lobby for legislation that will protect them from the ever-increasing litigation crisis. "Among the most costly and frivolous

lawsuits are construction-site-accident claims. Engineers ordinarily have no responsibility for construction-site safety. Nevertheless, obtaining indemnity against these

claims from the contractor, or defense under the contractor's general liability policy, is difficult. In my experience, such claims constitute the most frivolous malpractice

claims filed against design professionals."24

 

If engineers are better educated about the litigation process, perhaps they can better serve society at large. The courts are siding with contractors, which means that the

public feels engineers should continue answering for their designs on site. And maybe they should take a more active role. The only way to know for sure that their design

instructions are being adhered to is by getting involved, and by understanding both their social and legal responsibilities.


Negligence, Risk and the Professional Debate Over Responsibility

for Design

 

(ESSAY #5)

 

The Implicit Social Contract Between Engineers and Society

 

Engineering is a form of social experimentation. As with every experiment, there is a risk of negative consequences as well as positive ones. We need only examine the

way the quality and structure of life has changed over recent decades with the arrival of such phenomena as high-speed computers, new composite materials, new modes of

high-speed transportation, and new advances in bio-engineering to appreciate the potential impact on society of technological change. Unfortunately, such advances are not

always accompanied by unalloyed blessings, and we must deal with the possible side effects. We must, for example, consider our needs for protection against invasion of

privacy to easily-accessible computerized records, or our needs for protection from the many drunken drivers who cause over 20,000 deaths per year.

 

As engineers test designs for ever-increasing speeds, loads, capacities and the like, they must always remember their larger societal obligation: protecting the public

welfare. After all, the public has provided engineers, through the tax base, with an educational opportunity, and, through legislation, with the means for licensing and

regulating themselves. In return, engineers have a responsibility for protecting the safety and well-being of the public in all of their design efforts. This is part of the

implicit social contract all engineers agree to when they accept admission to an engineering college.

 

The Issue of Public Risk and Informed Consent

 

As technology advances, risks are unavoidable. Thus, the issues of risk and decision making confront all engineering professionals. Recognizing there will always be

some measure of risk associated with engineering design, how do engineers know when those risks outweigh the possible benefits gained from their work? How do they

make informed decisions?

 

Engineering, more than any other profession, involves social experimentation. Often one engineer's decision affects the safety of countless lives. It is, therefore, important

that engineers constantly remember that their first obligation is to ensure the public's safety. This is a difficult assignment, for engineers are not typically autonomous

professionals. Most of them work for salaries within a structured environment where budgets, schedules and multiple projects are important factors in the decision-making

process.

 

The decision-making process is often complicated by the fact that most engineers have multiple responsibilities attached to their job descriptions. They are responsible for

actual engineering practice (including research, development and design), for making proposals and writing reports, for managing projects and personnel, and often for

sales and client liaison. In other words, engineers, by the very nature of their professional stature both outside and inside the corporate structure, cannot work in a vacuum.

Graduation is not a license to merely tinker in an engineering laboratory. As an engineer advances, she will be given more authority for directing projects.

 

This is a natural phenomenon in the engineering community. Most engineers aspire to managerial positions, even if only on one specific project. There are many benefits

associated with managerial authority, not the least of which are increased financial remuneration and job satisfaction. But authority comes with a heavy price tag: increased

responsibility for decisions made. It is important to remember that responsibility always rests with the project leader.

 

Eventually, engineers and engineering managers have to make tough decisions about whether a product is safe for public use. Sometimes those decisions involve conflicts

over technical problems versus budgets, and problems with schedules and personnel allocations. The engineering manager must first be an engineering professional.

Before attending to profits, she must meet professional engineering code requirements and obligations to public safety. This requirement can create difficulties for the

engineer.

 

The problems engineering professionals face involve how to define, assess and manage risk in the light of obligations to the public at large, the employer, and the

engineering profession as a whole. The following literature review acts as a catalyst for discussion on risk and the decision-making process as it relates to the cases you are

studying. Bear in mind that, above all, risk assessment is closely tied to the perspective that engineering is a social experiment, that engineers have an implicit social

contract with the public they serve, and that professional societies and their codes of ethics play important roles in helping shape the engineering decision-making process.

 

Risk

 

In 1990 Theodore S. Glickman and Michael Gough assembled a number of papers, Readings in Risk, as an introduction to risk definition, assessment, evaluation and

management.1 Three papers in the series offer definitions of what we mean by risk, as it relates to the engineering profession.2

 

These three papers pose the classic question about technology-induced risk: "How safe is safe enough?" The answer to this question often depends on who is asked,

whether the risk taken is voluntary or involuntary, what the near-term and long-term consequences are, and what the spatial distribution as well as expected probability of

the risk is. As an adjunct, how we perceive and evaluate each given risk depends on factors such as the magnitude of exposure to the risk, whether the effects are

reversible, and whether threshold levels of those risks exist. Even if we can establish these parameters, we must remember that computations are based on our best

available evidence, not necessarily the appropriate evidence. Our analyses often neglect the realities of uncertain inputs and exogenous disturbances to the system under

study; therefore, probabilities entered in a numerical risk assessment are, at best, judicious engineering estimates. Nevertheless, we must perform risk assessments to

establish what public risks can be undertaken, given the possible benefits from the technological advances being pursued. Where do we find our starting point in assessing

risk?

 

Assessing Risk

 

We start with things we know. Risk assessment deals with setting magnitudes on the risks we know exist. This involves using tools such as fault- or event-tree analyses,

and requires probability-based estimates (or sometimes knowledge) of the likelihood of a given fault or event. Once we have estimates, we can look at how best to

minimize the risk.

 

Risk abatement addresses problems associated with how risks can be regulated or minimized. This means we have to address political questions associated with managing

risk. Who should manage the risks? How should the risk be managed, and at what level in the hierarchy should risk be managed? This political analysis can only begin

after the most accurate risk assessment possible is undertaken. Of course, this puts the greatest burden of proof on the engineers, and often stretches their capabilities.

 

In his "Social Benefits Versus Technological Risk,"3 Chauncey Starr concludes that we are generally willing to take voluntary risks that are 1000 times (three orders of

magnitude) as uncertain as involuntary risks. In Starr's studies, risk is generally proportional to the cube of the incremental wages involved in recognition for taking that

risk. For example, doubling wages would tend to convince a worker to take eight times the risk. Further, there is a perceived separation of three orders of magnitude

between involuntary risks (such as a corporations placing a toxic waste dump in your area) and voluntary risks such as smoking. Thus, studies show that people tend to

overestimate the likelihood of low probability risks associated with causes of death. The converse is also true. Such tendencies lead to overconfident biasing (or

"anchoring") in personal risk assessments, which in turn suppresses adjusting the assessment for the realities of the situation. In his study of 57 risk abatement programs at

five different government agencies in Washington (including the Environmental Protection Agency and Occupational Safety and Health Administration), Starr shows that

risk abatement programs cost from $170,000 to $3 million in cost/life in different agencies. But this presents a new problem how do you affix a price tag to a human life?

This is not an easy task.

 

To assist in solving this problem, Norman C. Rasmussen, in "The Application of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Techniques to Energy Technologies,"4 suggests a more

basic definition for "risk," namely, "consequences/unit time." Rasmussen argues that risk is the product of frequency (events/unit time) and magnitude

(consequences/event). For example, to compute whether you would have been one of the approximately 50,000 auto fatalities in a given year, multiply the number of auto

accidents/year (about 15 x 106) times the death rate per accident (one in 300). Yet, to make Rasmussen's formula work, we must be able to differentiate between the

unknown versus the "dreaded" risks. And within each category we must be able to differentiate whether those risks are observable, controllable, voluntary, short-term,

fatal, increasing and so on, and attach an appropriate weighting factor to each of these considerations as they enter into our numerical risk assessment. According to

Rasmussen's study, these weighting factors can vary between zero and 100, thereby making accurate risk predictions problematical indeed.

 

One of the most serious drawbacks to any risk assessment is perhaps the omission of totally random and exogenous inputs. Such random and exogenous inputs cannot be

predicted at all, and yet, when performing the final analysis of a catastrophe, they are often the key items in the sequence of events that lead to the disaster. Most airplane

crash and explosion disaster investigations have pointed to one or two exogenous causal factors, the absence of which would have prevented the disaster. These same

causal factors, however, could not have been foreseen, and therefore the likelihood of their occurring could not have been predicted. One example of this is the real-world

scenario involving the pilot who accidentally spills his coffee over the control console, thereby unwittingly setting off an "engine on fire" alarm, which in turn led to

catastrophe. (This was popularized in the book and movie of the 1950's, "Fate Is the Hunter.")

 

With all these drawbacks, you might ask, "Well, why bother?" The answer is that, we must still perform risk assessments to the best of our abilities in order to protect

ourselves from those problems we do know about, or can foresee.

 

So, how can we answer the question, "How Safe Is Safe Enough?" We must first recognize that there is no single, simple answer. We are often choosing between

unpleasant alternatives. There will always be some level of risk associated with engineering and innovation; therefore, any risk analysis should involve the following five

steps:

 

1. Define all the possible alternatives.

 

2. Specify the objectives and measure the effects.

 

3. Identify the consequences of the actions taken.

 

4. Quantify the alternatives based on the best available information.

 

5. Analyze the alternatives to arrive at the best choice for cost/risk.

 

Once engineers and managers have established, to the best of their abilities, the costs versus benefits of the risks involved, they must manage that risk.

 

Managing Risk

 

In a recent article,5 Michael Davis notes there are five major problems associated with managing risk:

 

1. We must deal with uncertainties.

 

2. We are often forced into too narrow a focus on specific classes of risk.

 

3. A commitment is required to provide immediate solutions, instead of "going slow."

 

4. Our adversarial world promotes inflexibility in our risk analyses.

 

5. The nature of a risk management program does not promote consensus, collaboration or cooperation between all involved.

 

The last point, in particular, is important for the engineering professional. In recent discussions6 with engineering professionals at a large research and development firm,

engineers (both managerial engineers and nonmanagerial engineers) note that engineering team players need to know all the particulars associated with the problem at hand.

This includes budgetary and time constraints, promises made to clients, and realistic assessments of technological flaws.

 

Risk management is perhaps the most important aspect of the engineer's professional tool kit. It is important for the public, our corporations, and for the engineering

profession at large. As Michael Davis notes, managers and engineers approach risk in different ways. Managers have to factor in such things as schedules, budgets and

contract requirements. Engineers tend to place safety considerations above all others. Engineers need more training in balancing risk versus benefit, so they can better

communicate their legitimate concerns about public safety. For both managers and engineers alike, the likely tendency is to look at their work through a microscope, and,

accordingly, not to see the many complications that fall just outside the field of resolution we are viewing.

 

Microscopic vision is enhanced vision, a giving up of information not likely to be useful under the circumstances for information more likely to be useful. If a point of light

at the other end, microscopic vision is like looking into a microscope at things otherwise too small to see. [Microscopia is neither nearsighted nor myopic it's not a kind of

blindness; rather, it's a kind of insight. A person with microscopic vision need only look up from the microscope.] ... Microscopic vision is a power, not a handicap, but

even power has its price. You cannot both look into the microscope and see what you would see if you did not.7

 

Thus, as Davis argues, risk management programs force us to look up from the microscope, so we are better equipped for avoiding tragedies due to failed innovation.

 

The decision-making process is never an easy one. The important thing all engineers must remember is that their first obligation is to public safety. Some risk is

unavoidable. Engineering professionals must learn how to convince their managers that minimizing that risk is worth the effort involved.

 

Negligence and the Codes Of Ethics Of Professional Societies

 

What guidelines do the professional codes of ethics give engineers? The following pages contain two such codes: the ASME, and the recently revised IEEE code adopted

by the IEEE Board of Directors in October 1990. Note the emphasis in the first clause of the new IEEE code on the public's welfare, and the responsibility cited in the

second clause for engineers to inform all affected parties of any inherent dangers or risks. This is very different from engineering codes of ethics written in past decades,

where the primary concern was competitive bidding, advertising, obligations to employers and clients, and so on. While these are all important issues for professionals,

they are less important than obligations to the public those obligations implicit in the engineers' adopted social contract.

 

In their recent book on engineering and ethics,8 Mike Martin and Roland Schinzinger cite earlier studies on the responsibilities of engineers. They summarize these

responsibilities as involving the following considerations:

 

1. A primary obligation to protect the safety and respect the right of consent of human subjects.

 

2. A constant awareness of the experimental nature of any project, imaginative forecasting of its possible side affects, and a reasonable effort to monitor them.

 

3. Autonomous, personal involvement in all steps of a project.

 

4. Accepting accountability for the results of a project.9

 

Martin and Schinzinger's implicit assumptions are that: a) engineers are and should be held responsible for past actions; b) engineers are responsible for the roles they have

played in projects; c) engineers are capable of making moral (and certainly technically correct) decisions autonomously; and d) as such, each individual engineer is

accountable for the projects she/he works on. Thus, an engineer can be deemed negligent if she/he does not meet these criteria.

 

ASME Code Of Ethics Of Engineers

 

The Fundamental Principles

 

Engineers uphold and advance the integrity, honor, and dignity of the Engineering profession by:

 

I. using their knowledge and skill for the enhancement of human welfare;

 

II. being honest and impartial, and serving with fidelity the public, their employers and clients; and

 

III. striving to increase the competence and prestige of the engineering profession.

 

The Fundamental Canons

 

1. Engineers shall hold paramount the safety, health and welfare of the public in the performance of their professional duties.

 

2. Engineers shall perform services only in areas of their competence.

 

3. Engineers shall continue their professional development throughout their careers and shall provide opportunities for the professional development of those engineers

under their supervision.

 

4. Engineers shall act in professional matters for each employer or client as faithful agents or trustees, and shall avoid conflicts of interest.

 

5. Engineers shall build their professional reputation on the merit of their services and shall not compete unfairly with others.

 

6. Engineers shall associate only with reputable persons or organizations.

 

7. Engineers shall issue public statements only in an objective and truthful manner.

 

IEEE Code Of Ethics (Revised October 1990)

 

We, the members of the IEEE, in recognition of the importance of our technologies in affecting the quality of life throughout the world, and in accepting a personal

obligation to our profession, its members and the communities we serve, do hereby commit ourselves to the highest ethical and professional conduct and agree:

 

1. to accept responsibility in making engineering decisions consistent with the safety, health, and welfare of the public, and to disclose promptly factors that might

endanger the public or the environment;

 

2. to avoid real or perceived conflicts of interest whenever possible, and to disclose them to affected parties when they do exist;

 

3. to be honest and realistic in stating claims or estimates based on available data;

 

4. to reject bribery in all its forms;

 

5. to improve the understanding of technology, its appropriate application, and potential consequences;

 

6. to maintain and improve our technical competence and to undertake technological tasks for others only if qualified by training or experience, or after full disclosure of

pertinent limitations;

 

7. to seek, accept, and offer honest criticism of technical work, to acknowledge and correct errors, and to credit properly the contributions of others;

 

8. to treat fairly all persons regardless of such factors as race, religion, gender, disability, age, or national origin;

 

9. to avoid injuring others, their property, reputation, or employment by false or malicious action;

 

10. to assist colleagues and coworkers in their professional development and to support them in following this code of ethics.

 

Both the legal and medical ethics literature look